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9FABIAN BURKHARDT
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PUTIN’S THIRD TERM: 
WAS CRIMEA A CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
 IN DOMESTIC POLITICS?
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 marked a watershed 
in international law and politics. It caused, as the political scientist 
Richard Sakwa puts it, “the most dangerous confrontation since 
the end of the Cold War, if not since the Cuban missile crisis of 
October 1962.”1 At the time, even seasoned analysts were unsure 
what this watershed might entail. Writing shortly afterwards, the 
political scientist Andrew Wilson struggled over whether it meant 
an “immediate end to the post-Cold War order. Or, like the 
original Crimean War in the 1850s, it might mark the beginning of 
a transition to something else.”2 
DID CRIMEA MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN DOMESTIC POLITICS?
While the argument that the first land grab since the end of 
the World War II in Europe marks an international caesura is 
straightforward, the assessment of its meaning for domestic politics 
in Russia demands a closer look. Beyond the obvious observation 
that Russia (de facto, not de jure) incorporated Crimea and the 
city of Sevastopol into its federal system, many aspects of Russian 
1 R. Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, London: I.B.Tauris, 
2015, p. 238.
2 A. Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West, New Haven–London: 
Yale University Press, 2014, p. 205.
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politics were affected. After Crimea, those who had participated 
in the diverse, anti-government “Bolotnaya” protest movement of 
2011–2012 were split over how to respond to Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine; subsequent subnational elections in Russian regions grew 
even less competitive; independent media increasingly came under 
pressure; and the “politics of fear”3 was applied against potential 
challengers of the official policy. This tendency led Vladimir 
Gel’man to conclude that the Ukraine crisis should be viewed as 
a “trigger event that accelerated the Kremlin’s existing trend when 
it came to changing the domestic political agenda.”4
This combination of continuity and accelerated change 
after Crimea sparked divergent assessments of Russia’s regime 
type. While Gel’man sees an increased militarization and 
personalism, he still puts the Russian regime in a bracket of 
electoral authoritarianism, citing its regular multi-party elections.5 
In the view of Lev Gudkov, one of Russia’s leading sociologists, 
state media and social media are both used as an instrument of 
propaganda to manipulate public opinion: Crimea, in this respect, 
marked a return to Soviet paradigms and even a “relapse into 
totalitarianism.”6 Kirill Rogov, an independent analyst and former 
senior research fellow at the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, 
and Nikolay Petrov, a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of 
Economics, take Gel’man’s argument about regime personalization 
and deinstitutionalization a step further. In Putin’s 3rd term between 
2012 and 2016,7 they believe, the regime has transitioned from 
a form of “corporatism” to “sultanism.”8 In sum, those authors 
adhering to cross-national regime type classifications tend to 
3 V. Gel’man, “The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers Counter Their Rivals,” 
Russian Politics 1, no. 1 (2016), pp. 27–45.
4 Idem, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, p. 127.
5 Ibidem.
6 L. Gudkov, “Putin’s Relapse into Totalitarianism,” in: The State of Russia: What  
Comes Next?, Houndmills–Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 86–109. 
7 The next presidential elections are  slated    for    the    18    March   2018, 
the 4th anniversary of the annexation of Crimea.
8 K. Rogov, N. Petrov, “Ispolnitel’naya vlast’ i silovyye korporatsii,” in: 
Politicheskoe razvitie Rossii. 2014–2016: Instituty i praktiki avtoritarnoy 
konsolidatsii, ed. K. Rogov, Moscow: Fond “Liberal’naya Missiya,” 2016,  
pp.  133 – 153.
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argue that Russia has remained within the same regime type of 
electoral authoritarianism or personalist dictatorship. Others who 
focus on changes over time from a non-comparative, longitudinal 
perspective seem to stress the qualitative changes Russia has 
undergone after Crimea. In this chapter, I first argue that a before/
after analysis of Crimea as a potential critical juncture in domestic 
politics can be a useful research design for this purpose. In the 
following sections, I divide several key dimensions of 
presidential power such as approval ratings, appointment and 
dismissal powers, repression, and presidential legislative success 
in periods before and after Crimea to assess the effect of this 
“external shock.” The conclusion summarizes the findings: 
Crimea caused a “rally around the leader” effect both in terms of 
presidential approval ratings and legislative activity, and thus 
contributed to a more pronounced personalist form of 
authoritarian governance, but other key regime characteristics 
remained in place. Crimea was thus both a trigger and an 
accelerator for domestic politics and presidential power in 
particular. On the other hand, slow-moving, more inert 
features allow the Russian regime to adapt to external 
challenges, but also make wholesale changes even in the face of 
major external shocks improbable.
A BEFORE-AFTER ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
CRIMEA AS CRITICAL JUNCTURE?
This chapter aims to tackle this ambiguity of continuity and change 
in domestic politics by employing a “before-after” research design9 
to assess presidential power in Vladimir Putin’s 3rd term. A single, 
longitudinal case—i.e. Putin’s 3rd presidential term—is divided into 
two sub-cases with the annexation of Crimea as the dividing line. If 
presidential power significantly differs before and after this alleged 
watershed, one could argue that Crimea also marked a critical 
juncture in domestic politics. Critical junctures arise in periods 
9 A.L. George, A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005, pp. 167–167.
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of crisis and are seen to be produced by “generative cleavages”10 
such as Russia’s strained relations with the West. In the course of 
a relatively short window of opportunity “the range of plausible 
choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and 
the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are 
potentially much more momentous.“11 The junctures are critical 
because in the aftermath it becomes increasingly difficult or even 
impossible to return to the status quo ante, and the previously 
available range of choices is narrowed down to the one path 
selected.12 Moreover, change that ensues such critical junctures has 
to be significant, swift and encompassing.13 
With the annexation of Crimea as an exogenous “shock” or 
“treatment”—brought upon Russia and the world by a small group 
of actors which reportedly included president Putin and the four 
officials Sergey Ivanov (head of the presidential administration), 
Nikolay Patrushev (Secretary of the Security Council), Alexandr 
Bortnikov (Director of the FSB), and Sergey Shoygu (Minister of 
Defense)14—a quasi-experimental design can be achieved by 
holding a maximum of potential factors constant across these two 
sub-cases before and after. 
Several challenges arise with this kind of research 
design. Two stand out: First, oftentimes more than one variable 
changes at a time making causal inference complicated. The 
annexation and the subsequent conflict between Russia and 
Western states triggered several waves of sanctions by the EU, 
the U.S. as well as other countries with increasing intensity, and 
counter-sanctions imposed by Russia in August 2014 as a 
response to the second sanctions wave launched by Western 
countries after the downing of the Malaysian airliner MH17. 
According to some computations, 
10 J. Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 39, no. 3 (2006), pp. 657–679.
11 G. Capoccia, R.D. Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, 
no. 3 (2007), p. 343.
12 J. Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and 
Society 29, no. 4 (2000), pp. 507–548.
13 J. Hogan, op.cit.
14 M. Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: The Four Metamorphoses of Vladimir Putin, 
New York: PublicAffairs, 2016.
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“1.97% of the GDP quarter-on-quarter growth is estimated to be lost 
due to sanctions by Russia.”15 Furthermore, the collapse of the oil 
price in the second half of 2014 until early 2015 was a further shock 
to Russia’s energy-dependent economy. Not only did this mean 
a significant decrease of revenues for Russia’s state budget, but also 
the ruble lost more than 50% of its value against the U.S. dollar, 
a slump that needs to be attributed precisely to the oil price shock, 
and not sanctions.16 Due to these harsh environmental factors, 
Russia’s GDP shrank by 3.7% in 2015, but only 0.9% in 2016 and 
is expected to grow in 2017 again. Over the years, Russia managed 
to adapt to these circumstances due to the “government’s policy 
response package of a flexible exchange rate policy, expenditure 
cuts in real terms, and bank recapitalization—along with tapping the 
Reserve Fund.”17 Hence, proximity to the “trigger event” in March 
2014 might indicate in how far domestic developments are related 
to the critical juncture under review, nevertheless the confluence of 
the mentioned confounding factors (land grab, sanctions, oil price 
shock and slump in budget revenues) call for caution in terms of 
attribution of single causes. 
Second, to gauge how significant and encompassing a 
critical juncture is the size of the window of opportunity matters. 
Depending on the demand for change directed at leaders, the 
freedom of action enjoyed by these leaders and the magnitude of 
the “rally round the flag” moment, windows could be micro or 
macro.18 Moreover, “even when political systems as a whole face 
‘unsettled times’, many institutions may remain unaffected.”19 There 
is little doubt that the annexation of Crimea was a swift event. Daniel 
Treisman even described it as a chaotic muddling through, where the 
15 K.A. Kholodilin, A. Netsunayev, “Crimea and Punishment: The Impact 
of Sanctions on Russian and European Economies,” Deutsches Institut Für 
Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Papers, 2016.
16 Christian Dreger et al., “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of 
Economic Sanctions and Oil Prices on Russia’s Ruble,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics 44, no. 2 (2016), pp. 295–308.
17 World Bank, “Russia Economic Report. The Russian Economy Inches 
Forward,” The World Bank Russia Economic Report, no. 36, November 2016, 
www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer.
18 A.P. Cortell, S. Peterson, “Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional 
Change,” British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1999), pp. 177–203.
19 G. Capoccia, R.D. Kelemen, op.cit., p. 347.
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political events “revealed an almost farcical lack of preparation.”20 
Putin, according to Treisman, showed himself “ready to gamble at 
moments of high tension, taking actions that were both highly risky 
and hard to reverse.”21 The idea of irreversibility already attests to 
a new path taken with Crimea. Nevertheless, in how far this change 
was all-encompassing for presidential power, one central aspect 
of domestic politics, needs further investigation. This is because 
in theory it is conceivable that for example Putin’s popularity was 
bolstered in the long-term, but party politics or relations between 
the center of power and the regions remained relatively unaltered. 
Presidential power notoriously is a fuzzy concept without 
a universally accepted, clear-cut definition. For the purpose of this 
chapter I propose to scrutinize those aspects of presidential power 
and activism that received broad attention after the annexation 
and were thought to be affected in the aftermath, in particular 
presidential approval ratings, appointment and dismissal powers, 
the fight against corruption and repression, as well as presidential 
success in the Duma. 
PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY AND LEGITIMACY:  
CRIMEA CHANGED—AND ACCELERATED—EVERYTHING
High presidential approval ratings in Russia are a crucial power 
resource for presidents to show other political actors—such as the 
government, the parliament or business—that their own political 
course taken is perceived to be on the right path by the broader 
population. But ratings can also signal to potential counter-elites that 
rebellion is futile, due to large-scale popular support. As Russia’s 
political system is president-centered, presidential approval is also 
a crucial aspect of regime legitimacy in general. 
Russian pollsters have conducted opinion surveys on 
presidential popularity since the early 1990s, and the overall finding 
20 D. Treisman, “Crimea: Anatomy of a Decision,” Russia Political Insight, 
26 August 2016, p. 13, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55510affe4b06afec 
a50df07/t/57d3917e3e00be430c4c5b4e/1473483134670/Crimea+FINAL+ 
Aug+26.pdf.
21 Ibidem, p. 20.
Presidential Power in Putin’s Third Term… 125
about presidential approval in the last quarter century is that Yeltsin 
kicked off his presidency with 81% approval in 1991 with the rating 
plummeting into the single digits by the end of his 2nd term while 
Putin kicked off his 1st term in the early 2000s with approval ratings 
between 60% and 80%. Treisman showed that public perceptions of 
economic performance best explain this glaring difference between 
presidents Yeltsin and Putin.22 Consequently, Putin’s ratings were 
continuously subsiding from well-above 80% in 2008 to record 
low 63% in 2012 when the global financial crisis and Russia’s 
structural reform deficit hit the economy, and, in turn, public 
perception. The regime successfully managed the rokirovka—the 
power transfer from Medvedev back to Putin in 2012—and then 
saw off the street protests in the aftermath of this rokirovka as well 
as falsified parliamentary elections in 2011. But the economy, and 
hence presidential approval, did not pick up again. 
However, as Sergey Guriev noted, Russia’s intervention in 
Crimea in early 2014 “changed everything.”23 Already by March 
2014, Putin’s rating had jumped back to over 80%, and in October 
both VCIOM and independent Levada reported 89% approval. The 
magnitude of this “Crimean consensus effect”24 was not unfamiliar 
to the Putin administration: The Kremlin had experienced before 
how military campaigns such as the Second Chechen War after 
1999, the five day war with Georgia or international disagreement 
with the United States, such as after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
can significantly help boost presidential popularity. Much more 
consequential than the mere “rally around the flag effect” and the 
already proverbial 86% approval was that Crimea helped to 
decouple presidential popularity ratings from the well-being of 
the Russian economy. It was not the perception about expected 
improvement of future public and personal welfare that led 
Russians to rally round their president: The main drivers became 
Russia’s improved international standing in the world. This was 
done through Putin showing off Russia’s defense capabilities and 
22 D. Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin 
and Putin,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011), pp. 590–609.
23 S. Guriev, “In Russia, It’s Not the Economy, Stupid,” The New York Times, 
25 December 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/12/25/opinion/in-russia-its-not-the-
economy-stupid.html.
24 See Ben Noble’s chapter in this volume on the Crimean consensus and 
legislative politics. 
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reformed military—both to its people and to the world—with a tour 
de force first in Ukraine, and later in Syria. 
Figure 1. Approval of Vladimir Putin and answers to open questions 
about Putin’s main achievements between 2004 and 2016
Source: Compiled by the author with data from levada.ru and a data set provided by 
Stepan Goncharov: https://infogr.am/2e301a41-6d1e-4a8a-95c1-cd4c2ce98977. 
Figure 1 shows that until 2009, Russians primarily considered 
Putin’s main achievement to be rising living standards through 
wage growth and secure pension plans. Russians approved of Putin 
because they associated him with the country’s wider economic 
development. Another reason Russians approved of Putin back 
then was that he gave Russians reasons to be optimistic about the 
future. While Russia’s international standing became an important 
aspect of Putin’s approval already by the mid-2000s, Russians 
had shifted their focus onto defense and military capabilities only 
in 2014, when 28% said these were Putin’s main achievements. 
By 2016, the reversal of this larger trend had been cemented: for 
a majority, Russia’s military and international standing now comes 
first, and economy and welfare have been pushed into second place 
when assessing the main achievements of their president. Hence, 
for presidential popularity, and for regime legitimacy as a whole, 
Crimea was both an accelerator and trigger at once. 
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PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT AND DISMISSAL POWERS
Appointment and dismissal powers are certainly among the 
most significant ways a president can steer political processes. 
In most general terms, presidents face a dilemma: appoint loyal, 
ideologically close officials from their patronage networks, 
or guarantee competence and performance through a more 
meritocratic choice. In Russia, it is usually assumed that preference 
is given to loyalty over competence25 although meritocratic 
elements also exist.26 A second crucial aspect is the frequency with 
which these appointments occur. Since the mid-2000s a system of 
cadre rotation has been in place,27 which regularly rotates outsiders 
into federal state organs and regional administrations28 to prevent 
departmentalism and localism respectively. When presidents sack 
officials this is oftentimes perceived as a purge or a weakness of 
the president as these subordinates allegedly cannot be trusted 
anymore. On the other hand, regular cadre rotation can also be 
assessed as a “feature of administrative centralization”29 and 
state formation. Moreover, regular rotation has been found to be 
conducive to coup-proofing—i.e. by preventing vested interests 
from coordination and rebellion against the autocrat.30 
25 O.J. Reuter, G.B. Robertson, “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian 
Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments,” The Journal of 
Politics 74, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1023–1037.
26 V. Gimpelson, V. Magun, R.J. Brym, “Hiring and Promoting Young Civil 
Servants: Weberian Ideals versus Russian Reality,” in: Russian Bureaucracy 
and the State: Officialdom from Alexander III to Vladimir Putin, ed. E. Huskey, 
D.K. Rowney, Springer, 2009, pp. 231–252.
27 E. Huskey, “Legacies and Departures in the Russian State Executive,” in: Historical 
Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, ed. M.R. Beissinger, 
S. Kotkin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 111–127.
28 M. Rochlitz et al., “Performance Incentives and Economic Growth: Regional 
Officials in Russia and China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, 
no. 4 (2015), pp. 421–445.
29 D. Siegel, “The Political Logic of Cadre Rotation in Post-Soviet Central Asia,” 
Problems of Post-Communism, 4 April 2017, p. 2.
30 S. Chestnut Greitens, “Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions 
and State Violence,” Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Cambridge–
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
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In the following, I will review presidential appointment 
patterns in the presidential administration, the government, federal 
districts and regions. 
PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
Two major appointments made waves in 2016: in August, the silovik 
heavy-weight Sergey Ivanov was replaced by the young technocrat 
Anton Vayno as new head of the presidential administration (PA).31 
Later in October, Rosatom’s Sergey Kiriyenko became new head of 
the PA’s Domestic Politics Department as Vyacheslav Volodin was 
soon to be elected new chairman of the State Duma after United 
Russia’s landslide victory in the September parliamentary elections. 
Table 1 shows all dismissals and appointments of top officials 
in the PA ranging from the head, deputy heads to department heads.
Table 1. Dismissals and appointments of high-ranking presidential 
 administration officials compiled from presidential decrees
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total Dismissals 4 2 0 1 3
Total Appointments 22 5 1 1 4
What becomes clear is that the year 2016 was not so 
extraordinary after all. Several trends need to be noted: elections 
are important, in particular presidential elections. In the course 
of election campaigns, leading staff in the PA must be dismissed 
and reappointed, which explains the highest figure of 22 in 
2012. Secondly, none of the dismissals can be classified as an 
explicit purge: all officials were transferred and reassigned to 
other positions. These new postings obviously could also be less 
prestigious, such as Sergey Ivanov’s move to special envoy for the 
environment, or the senate mandate given to the former head of the 
31 F. Burkhardt, “Russia’s New Generation of Technocrats,” Intersection, 
16 August 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/russias-new-
generation-technocrats.
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Domestic Politics Department Oleg Morozov. (Senate mandates 
are often seen as a sinecure. Morozov left this post as well in 
2015.) Thirdly, it is easily observed that in the period between the 
presidential elections of 2012 and the Duma elections of 2016, 
cadre decisions are idiosyncratic. In 2013, for example, Ksenia 
Yudayeva was promoted from the PA’s Expert Department to Vice 
Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank, Yudayeva was replaced by 
Vladimir Simonenko, who had been Deputy Minister of Economic 
Development. Also in 2013, a new department for the fight against 
corruption was created within the PA which was the result of 
a restructuring of the Department for State Service and Cadres, from 
which the new head Oleg Plokhoy was promoted. 
Certainly, Vayno’s style as head of the PA is less hands-on, 
more detached than their predecessors’—and the same goes for 
Kiriyenko in his new role. Nevertheless, it will only be after the 
presidential elections in March 2018 when a definite judgment on 
their appointment strategy and governance style will be possible. 
So in sum, other factors besides Crimea are crucial for assessing 
cadre policy in the PA.
GOVERNMENT
The same logic as with the PA applies to government ministers: the 
government lays down its mandate before presidential elections, 
and the president-elect appoints the new PM and cabinet ministers. 
In contrast to the 1990s, when cabinet reshuffles were frequent also 
in between presidential elections, in the 2000s cabinets usually 
remained relatively stable over the presidential terms, and ministers 
were replaced only on rare occasions.32 
The government under Prime Minister Medvedev was 
installed on 21 May 2012 by presidential decree and consisted 
32 G. Neyaskin, “Rasstrel’nye dolzhnosti: kak chasto rossiyskiye ministry 
ostayutsya bez raboty,” Republic.ru, 1 September 2016, https://republic.ru/
app.php/posts/72647; E. Semenova, “Russia. Cabinet Formation and Careers in 
a Super-Presidential System,” in: The Selection of Ministers around the World, 
ed. K.M. Dowding, P. Dumont, Routledge Research on Social and Political 
Elites 5, London–New York: Routledge, 2015, pp. 139–155.
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of 21 ministers: seven of them had been replaced by the end 
of 2016. The Ministry of Economic Development experienced 
the highest turnover. In June 2013, Alexey Ulyukayev replaced 
Andrey Belousov who became economic advisor in the PA. In 
November 2016, Ulyukayev was arrested on corruption charges; 
his place was taken by the 1982-born Maxim Oreshkin. Already 
by November 2012, Minister of Defense Serdyukov was accused 
of embezzlement in the case of the MoD contractor Oboronservis, 
and was replaced by Sergey Shoygu. Beside these two exceptional 
cases, it was mainly the restructuring of the federal executive 
that affected appointment patterns. This concerned the upgraded 
Ministry for Utilities (ZhKKh) in 2013, and the creation of the 
Crimea Ministry in March 2014 and the North Caucasus Ministry 
in 2014. The Minster for Crimean Affairs Oleg Savelev remained 
in office for only 15 months—the ministry was liquidated in July 
2015 after it had launched a 708 million ruble funding 
program for the peninsula, the management and supervision of 
which was subsequently transferred to the Economy ministry. 
Appointments of Alexandr Tkachev (Agriculture) in 2015, 
Olga Vasileva (Education) and Pavel Kolobkov (Sports) in 
2016 attest to minor policy adjustments rather than larger 
reshuffles with the purpose of broader policy shifts. Vasileva, for 
example, was widely portrayed as an ideocrat who would give 
education an increasingly patriotic touch. Her main initiative in 
office, however, was to cut spending on education, something 
her “technocratic” predecessor Livanov had resisted. The 
abolishment of the Crimea ministry and the appointment of 
Tkachev—a staunch supporter of Russian counter-sanctions, 
import substitutions, and first and foremost his own agriculture 
business—suggest that already by mid-2015 Crimea and its 
management have been fully incorporated into the federal 
economic policy making routine. More importantly, in the case 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Crimea did have a clear and 
persistent effect, while change at top of the Ministry of 
Education followed a different logic.
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PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND GOVERNORS
A year later, on 28 July 2016 the Crimean Federal District—it had 
been created on 21 March 2014 and comprised the two subjects 
Crimea and Sevastopol—was abolished and incorporated into 
the Southern Federal District. Reducing the number of federal 
districts to seven again and thereby losing its special status, by mid-
2016 also Crimean security and law enforcement related issues 
were managed in conjunction with other federal subjects of the 
Southern District. On the same day, in a “massive cadre reshuffle”33 
a total of 4 governors and 5 presidential representatives in federal 
districts (polpredy) were dismissed and appointed. 
Was this reshuffle in any way unprecedented, and can we 
draw any inferences about a potential coup-proofing strategy, or 
an increased regime personalization after Crimea? Figures 2 and 
3 present annual dismissal rates of polpredy and governors as well 
as exit fates of the latter. As the systematic overview of polpredy 
dismissals since their inception in 2000 shows, by the end of 
2016 Putin has dismissed the same amount of envoys in his 3rd term 
as Medvedev during his presidency: nine each in total. In 2011, 
Medvedev also dismissed four polpredy in the course of four months, 
in particular the two long-time polpredy Poltavchenko (since 2000) 
and Klebanov (since 2003). In Putin’s 3rd term polpredy would 
serve between three to four years, hence over time cadres were 
rotated more frequently than in the previous presidential terms. The 
exit fates of the polpredy dismissed in 2016 also attest to the cadre 
rotation principle at work: Vladimir Bulavin (North-Western) was 
appointed Head of the Federal Customs Service, Sergey Melikov 
(North Caucasian) became 1st Deputy Head of the National Guard 
with Oleg Belaventsev (Crimean) replacing him, Vladimir Ustinov 
was reappointed in the Southern Federal District now united with 
the Crimean District, and Nikolay Rogozhkin (Siberian) left state 
service as he reached retirement age with 65 years. The main 
difference to previous practice was that this occurred on one day 
33 N. Raibman, “Putin provel masshtabnye kadrovye perestanovki,” Vedomosti, 
no. 28, 2016, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/07/28/650900-glavnogo-
tamozhennika.
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while earlier this would have been implemented over the course 
of several months. The following years will show whether this 
practice—which certainly demands more planning ahead from the 
PA—persists in the future. 
Figure 2. Presidential representatives in federal districts (polpredy) 
dismissed per year (by days in office)
Source: compiled by the author based on presidential decrees. 
Figure 3 visualizes governor dismissal data and exit fates. 
Between 2004 and 2012 governors were appointed by the president, 
in late 2011 Medvedev had announced the reintroduction of 
gubernatorial elections that had been in place before 2004. On the 
one hand, the intention of this reform was to increase the legitimacy 
of regional heads of administration, on the other it was rather 
obvious that the PA was concerned with reducing the uncertainty 
related to electoral processes from the very beginning.34 
One of the measures to assert central control was the 
introduction of United Voting Days which combined elections 
in several federal subjects. Another informal institution used has 
been the early dismissal of incumbent governors, which is usually 
accompanied by a presidential appointment to serve as interim 
governor until the next elections. This practice increases presidential 
leverage over governors; presidential endorsement also increases 
34 H. Blakkisrud, “Governing the Governors: Legitimacy vs. Control in the Reform 
of the Russian Regional Executive,” East European Politics 31, no. 1 (2015), 
pp. 104–121.
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the legitimacy of interim governors in the eyes of the electorate, 
and with regard to potential competitors. 
Figure 3. Gubernatorial elections and exit fate of governors in Putin’s 
3rd term. Only first quarter for 2017
Source: compiled by the author. 
Figure 3 illustrates that, in 2014, almost 2/3 of gubernatorial 
elections were held after early presidential dismissals of governors. 
Gulnaz Sharafutdinova argues that this strategy was chosen “in 
order to use the patriotic momentum associated with the Crimea 
annexation (‘krymnash’ effect) and get re-elected before the 
negative impact of Western (and anti-Western) economic sanctions 
were felt in the regions.”35 This Crimea effect was most noticeable 
in 2014 and 2015 when early dismissals were predominantly 
employed to safeguard the reelection of incumbent governors. In 
2016 and early 2017, however, early dismissals were used to replace 
incumbents by new governors and therefore preempt election by 
“quasi-appointments.” 2014 and 2015 were thus more about cadre 
stability while 2016, and in particular 2017, mark a decided return 
to the principle of cadre rotation. 
35 G. Sharafutdinova, “Regional Governors Navigating through Putin’s Third 
Term,” Russian Politics 1, no. 4 (2016), p. 376.
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This informal institution of early resignation certainly did not 
contribute to a heightened legitimacy of governors. Nevertheless, 
it would be an overstatement to argue that the stability trend in 
2014 and 2015 was due to a “scarce gubernatorial cadre pool.”36 In 
fact, only the strategy changed—electoral authoritarianism tweaked 
in order to guarantee an uneven playing field favoring the ruling 
elite. The appointments in early 2017 show, especially, that a new 
cohort of governors born in the 1960s and 1970s is about to replace 
an older one born in the 1940s and 1950s. Figure 3 also illustrates 
that among those who were eased out of their positions, arrests 
and criminal investigation were an exception: two detentions of 
governors in 2014, two in 2015, one in 2016, and two by April 
2017 respectively—i.e. the predominant presidential strategy 
towards governors was an adaptive mixture of stability of cadres 
and rotation, not open repression. 
DISMISSALS AND THE “FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION” IN RUSSIA
The ostentatious arrests of so-called “systemic liberals” like the 
arrest of Kirov’s governor, Nikita Belykh, in June 2016, or that 
of the Minister of Economic Development, Alexey Ulyukayev, 
in November 2016, sent shock waves through Russia’s political 
and economic elite. Was this the beginning of a new purge of 
remaining systemic liberals in Russia’s public administration, the 
start of a major shift in economic policy? After all, Ulyukayev had 
been one of the main pillars of monetary and economic policy 
under Putin when he had served as deputy finance minister, deputy 
chairman of the Central Bank; he was the 1st acting Minister in 
post-Soviet Russia to be arrested on charges of corruption. In the 
aftermath of such high profile arrests, usually a number of theories 
begin to circulate: was it a conflict between the government and 
Rosneft’s Sechin over the privatization of the oil company Bashneft 
in the case of Ulyukayev? Or the misappropriation of informal 
election funds in the case of Belykh? Court trials in such prominent 
cases can drag on for long time and the “rule by law”-logic usually 
36 Ibidem, p. 382.
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determines highly politicized cases, so it is more than difficult to 
determine the true motives behind the arrests. 
The option that these arrests were instances of a systematic, 
consistent campaign against corruption should be excluded; 
this would undermine the basis upon which the current regime 
rests. Instead, it can be argued that graft and corruption are part 
of the “institutional mechanisms used to secure the loyalty and 
obedience of officials.”37 Following this logic, widespread informal 
practices and corruption are accepted or even encouraged, so that 
subordinates in the administrative hierarchy can be blackmailed. 
Prosecution and punishment are suspended, and, as a rule, 
are meted out towards disobedient or even politically disloyal 
subordinates. 
Figure 4. Officials arrested on corruption charges
Source: Based on a data bases collected39 by means of media reporting on such 
cases. 
Bearing in mind Russia’s ongoing economic stagnation 
and the “Crimea consensus effect” potentially subsiding, one 
might indeed surmise that increased punishment and repression 
was needed to control the administrativniki—state officials in the 
37 K. Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State 
Institution,” Politics & Society 36, no. 1 (2008), p. 37.
38 Ibidem.
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federal, regional and local administrations. To track the corruption-
related arrests of bureaucrats over time, I use a data set collected by 
Dmitry Filonov and Anastasiya Yakoreva39 and recoded it to allow 
for a differentiation of arrests on the three levels of administration. 
Several trends can be observed. The first recent wave of 
arrests started already in 2013 and saw almost twice as many 
arrests of local officials than from regional administrations. Being 
a mayor is notoriously dangerous in Russia.40 It is estimated that 
by 2007 every sixth acting mayor had either been in prison, is in 
prison or will likely wind up in prison, a development attributed 
to local conflicts around municipal land or real estate. In the first 
comprehensive academic paper on Russian mayors, it was found 
that between 2000 and 2012, “10% of elected mayors leave office 
under arrest, compared to 4% of appointed mayors.”41 Local officials 
had always been even more endangered. However, the persecution 
of governors, their deputies and regional cabinet ministers appears 
to be a fairly recent phenomenon; by 2016, the majority of arrests 
were largely of this type of official. So far, it seems to be too early 
to say whether regional and even federal civil servants have been 
increasingly persecuted by law enforcement, but the figures for 
2016, at least, point in this direction. In 2014 and 2015, two 
governors were arrested on corruption charges while in 2016 one 
governor, one deputy minister and one minister (Ulyukayev) were 
put on trial. In the first quarter of 2017, already two governors 
(Savel’ev from the Republic of Udmurtiya and Markelov from the 
Republic of Marii-El) were taken into custody, a sign this trend is 
at the very least persisting. Seizures of high-ranking officials are 
usually planned and implemented by the Federal Security Service 
FSB and the Investigative Committee. Often both agencies work in 
tandem, and their increasingly prominent role during these arrests 
indicates that selective repression against a few officials is used to 
discipline the federal and regional executive as a whole. 
39 D. Filonov, A. Yakoreva, “Vse protiv vsekh. Kak sazhayut chinovnikov 
v Rossii,” Republic.ru, 2016, https://republic.ru/posts/76987.
40 V. Leibin et al., “Pochemu sazhayut merov?,” Expert.ru, 2007, http://expert.ru/
russian_reporter/2007/02/pochemu_sazhayut_merov/.
41 N. Buckley et al., “Elections, Appointments, and Human Capital: The Case of 
Russian Mayors,” Demokratizatsiya 22, no. 1 (2014), p. 111.
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Often, a network of closely interconnected officials in one 
region is arrested all at once. This happened, most notably, in 
Voronezh in 2013, in Komi in 2015, and in Sakhalin, Perm, Kirov 
and Vladivostok in 2016. The annexation of Crimea added one 
more region where frequent arrests of officials were used to enforce 
federal control: 6 officials were captured on peninsula in 2015 and 
3 in 2016. In this sense, for the federal center, Crimea became 
yet another problematic region. Officials there were persecuted at 
a higher rate than an average Russian region. Alleged purges of 
prominent officials such as Belykh and Ulyukaev should thus be 
seen in the context of this federal strategy of “discipline and punish 
and make an example”—while regional and local conflicts also 
contribute to a pressure from below on officials at that level. 
RELATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE 
RELATIONS: VELOCITY AND VOTING PATTERNS IN THE DUMA
When Crimea was annexed, President Putin initiated three laws 
that were passed in the Russian State Duma with lightning speed. 
Their sole purpose was to formalize Crimea’s status as a part of 
the Russian Federation.42 All bills passed through the Duma with 
a majority of over 98%. Ilya Ponomarev, who was the only MP who 
voted against the accession of Crimea, was subsequently expelled 
from the Duma and is now living in exile. Several others abstained, 
but as Ponomarev has noted, high pressure was asserted to achieve 
a unanimous vote. Far more meaningful than the percentage voting 
42 These three laws are: (1) Zakonoproyekt No 475944-6 “O prinyatii v Rossiyskuyu 
Federatsiyu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii v sostave Rossiyskoy Federatsii novykh 
sub’’ektov—Respubliki Krym i goroda federal’nogo znacheniya Sevastopolya,” 
initiated on 19 March 2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28Spravka
New%29?OpenAgent&RN=475944-6&02; (2) Zakonoproyekt  No  475948-6 
“O ratifikatsii Dogovora mezhdu Rossiyskoy Federatsiyey i Respublikoy 
Krym o prinyatii v Rossiyskuyu Federatsiyu Respubliki Krym i obrazovanii 
v sostave Rossiyskoy Federatsii novykh sub’’ektov,” initiated on 19 March 
2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&
RN=475948-6&02; (3) Zakonoproyekt No 484131-6 “O prekrashchenii deystviya 
soglasheniy, kazayushchikhsya prebyvaniya Chernomorskogo flota Rossiyskoy Fede-
ratsii na territorii Ukrainy,” initiated on 28 March 2014, http://asozd2.duma.gov.
ru/ main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=484131-6&02.
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in favor was the speed with which the bills passed the Duma and 
were signed by the president: the two bills on the accession of 
Crimea were rushed through in a record low of two days; the bill 
on the suspension of the Black Sea fleet agreement took just five 
days before it was promulgated.
Analogous to the presidential approval rating discussed 
above, this speedy, unanimous voting pattern begs the question if, 
and for how long, a potential Crimea effect persisted. Unanimous 
parliamentary votes and the pace of legislation are useful indicators 
assessing presidential power. As Paul Chaisty’s research has found, 
higher legislative velocity in particular is a robust way to view 
Russia’s authoritarian turn.43 If there is a persistent sign of this after 
Crimea, that could also hint at further authoritarianism and a further 
shift of relative power towards the presidency.
Figure 5. Velocity of legislation initiated by the president measured in 
days between registration of the bill and presidential sign-off, the years 
indicate when the bills were initiated by the President. N= 407 bills
Source: data compiled by the author. 
Figure 5 visualizes the velocity of all bills initiated by the 
president in the period between the two Duma terms from 2007 to 
September 2016. Quite strikingly, between 2007 and 2010 the 
speed of both domestic legislation and international conventions 
remained roughly equal averaging around 100 days per year. 
43 P. Chaisty, “Presidential Dynamics and Legislative Velocity in Russia, 
1994–2007,” East European Politics 30, no. 4 (2014), pp. 588–601.
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However, by 2013 domestic legislation took more than four 
times as long to make it into law. Backlogs suggest that major 
disagreements existed within the executive that delayed legislative 
policy making. After Crimea, the average annual velocity dropped 
below 100 days and almost converged for both domestic and 
international legislation. The “rally around the legislative leader” 
with Crimea effect is clearly substantial. 
Once we turn to Duma voting results on presidential bills, 
a similar picture emerges. Especially in 2014, before the almost 
unanimous Crimea legislation, the voting rift between international 
and domestic legislation was almost 100 votes on average or 
442 compared to 345. 
Figure 6. Voting results in the Duma for all bills initiated by the president in 
Putin’s 3rd term until the end of the 6th Duma convocation. N = 171 bills
Source: data compiled by the author. 
While the United Russia faction would vote unanimously as 
a rule, at times mostly the Communist faction, a Just Russia, and 
on rare occasions the LDPR voted against or withheld their support 
for presidential initiatives. After Crimea, those of the nominal 
opposition would also rally around the “legislative leader,” and 
only on rare occasions the Communist faction would vote against. 
For instance, their opposition to a controversial anti-corruption 
legislation (Bill 664950-6). However, by 2016 the Crimea effect 
had markedly subsided, and on average, support for domestic 
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presidential bills dropped to 80%. Naturally, this does not mean 
that bill failures became likely. Nevertheless, with the looming 
Duma elections in September 2016, opposition factions—first 
and foremost the Communists—returned to their previous modus 
operandi: that is, signaling to their electorate that they sometimes 
differed from the mainstream. The Communists also used this option 
of voting against legislation as leverage with the PA. United Russia’s 
landslide victory at recent parliamentary elections, where the party 
gained an unprecedented constitutional majority, suggests that 
this endeavor from the Communists largely failed. Nevertheless, 
the increased representation of the Russian regions could lead to 
a situation where “deputies will have more room for discussion on 
economic issues important to the regions, whereas they will present 
a united front on security and foreign policy.”44 More debate within 
the United Russia faction and increased bargaining with the regions 
will only be feasible, however, if no other international adventure 
akin to the annexation of Crimea causes another “rally around the 
legislative leader” effect. 
CONCLUSION
The chapter started with the intention to investigate how far the 
annexation of Crimea affected domestic politics in Russia, and more 
specifically several prominent dimensions of presidential power. To 
answer this question I proposed to carve up Putin’s 3rd presidential 
term by means of a before/after research design to find out in how 
far Crimea was a critical juncture. 
The findings bear implications both for our understanding of 
the annexation of Crimea on Russian domestic politics as well as of 
external shocks and critical junctures more generally. On the one 
hand, the effect of Crimea was consistent and protracted, both with 
regard to presidential approval ratings, velocity of law-making and 
to a lesser degree voting patterns in the Duma. 
44 B. Noble, “Volodin’s Duma,” Intersection, 13 December 2016, http://
intersectionproject.eu/article/politics/volodins-duma.
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On the other hand, for other dimensions of presidential 
power Crimea was less of a caesura: for appointments and 
dismissals of officials in the federal and regional executive electoral 
cycles and the cadre rotation principle were crucial determinants 
of presidential activism. What is more, a gradual increase in rare, 
punctual repressions suggests that the Crimea effect has been 
gradually subsiding and that for policy-making under an ever more 
constrained basis of resources, a “discipline and punish” approach 
is employed as a technique of administrative control. Corrupt 
practices at the core of the system, meanwhile, remain in place. 
Crimea caused a “rally around the leader” effect both in terms 
of presidential approval ratings and legislative activity, and thus 
contributed to a more pronounced personalist form of authoritarian 
governance. But other key regime characteristics remained in 
place: non-competitive multi-party elections still perform 
important functions for the turnover of personnel in the state 
administration, and selective punishment of officials can be seen 
as a major instrument of governance. Crimea was thus both a 
trigger and an accelerator for domestic politics and presidential 
power in particular. On the other hand, slow-moving, more 
inert features allow the Russian regime to adapt cosmetically to 
external challenges, but even in the face of major external 
shocks, wholesale change of Russia’s governance structures 
looks improbable.
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